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a b s t r a c t 
Dynamic malware analysis is fast gaining popularity over static analysis since it is not easily defeated 
by evasion tactics such as obfuscation and polymorphism. During dynamic analysis it is common prac- 
tice to capture the system calls that are made to better understand the behaviour of malware. There 
are several techniques to capture system calls, the most popular of which is a user-level hook. To study 
the effects of collecting system calls at different privilege levels and viewpoints, we collected data at a 
process-speciﬁc user-level using a virtualised sandbox environment and a system-wide kernel-level using 
a custom-built kernel driver. We then tested the performance of several state-of-the-art machine learning 
classiﬁers on the data. Random Forest was the best performing classiﬁer with an accuracy of 95.2% for 
the kernel driver and 94.0% at a user-level. The combination of user and kernel level data gave the best 
classiﬁcation results with an accuracy of 96.0% for Random Forest. This may seem intuitive but was hith- 
erto not empirically demonstrated. Additionally, we observed that machine learning algorithms trained 
on data from the user-level tended to use the anti-debug/anti-vm features in malware to distinguish it 
from benignware. Whereas, when trained on data from our kernel driver, machine learning algorithms 
seemed to use the differences in the general behaviour of the system to make their prediction, which 
explains why they complement each other so well. Our results show that capturing data at different priv- 
ilege levels will affect the classiﬁer’s ability to detect malware, with kernel-level providing more utility 
than user-level for malware classiﬁcation. Despite this, there exist more established user-level tools than 
kernel-level tools, suggesting more research effort should be directed at kernel-level. In short, this paper 
provides the ﬁrst objective, evidence-based comparison of user and kernel level data for the purposes of 
malware classiﬁcation. 
© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
This is an open access article under the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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2. Introduction 
Malware , short for Malicious Software, is the all-encompassing
erm for unwanted software such as Viruses, Worms, and Trojans.
he threat of malware is highlighted by the fact that 350,0 0 0 new
amples of malware are identiﬁed every day [1] — far too many
or human analysts to manually analyse, thus motivating research
nto the automated detection of malware. Malware can be analysed
n one of two ways; through static code analysis or dynamic be-
avioural analysis. Static code analysis involves studying the binary
le and looking for patterns in its structure that might be indica-
ive of malicious behaviour without ever actually running the bi-
ary. Dynamic behavioural analysis involves running the binary in a∗ Corresponding author. 
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214-2126/© 2019 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article uontrolled environment, such as an emulated environment, or Vir-
ual Machine (VM), and searching for patterns of Operating System
OS) calls or general system behaviour that are indicative of mali-
ious behaviour. Static analysis has become less effective in recent
ears due to the fact that malware writers can circumvent detec-
ion methods using techniques such as code obfuscation and poly-
orphism [2,3] . As a result, behavioural analysis has gained popu-
arity since it actually runs malware in its preferred environment
aking it harder to evade detection completely. 
In order to conduct behavioural analysis, the sample being anal-
sed must be executed in such a way that data relating to the
ample’s behaviour can be captured while it is running. That data
an subsequently be used to train an automated machine learn-
ng classiﬁer to distinguish malicious from benign software. One
opular mechanism in the literature for understanding malware’s
ehaviour during execution is through capturing the calls made
o the OS i.e., system calls. In order to capture this information,nder the CC BY license. ( http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ ) 
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f  a tool must create a hook into the OS or monitored process. A
hook modiﬁes the standard execution pathway by inserting an ad-
ditional piece of code into the pathway [4] . This is done in order
to interrupt the normal ﬂow of execution that occurs when a pro-
cess makes a system call and subsequently document the event.
There are a number of methods to hook system calls in Windows
and these fall into two general categories: those that run in user
mode and those that run in kernel mode [4] . Kernel mode is one
of the highest privilege levels that can be reached in the computer,
whereas user mode is the privilege level that most applications
and users operate at. The argument for hooking in user mode is
that the code analysing the sample is “closer” to the application
being analysed. Whereas, the argument for hooking at kernel mode
is that the analysis program resides at a more elevated privilege
making it harder for malware to hide from an analysis tool at this
level. 
The terms user ’ and kernel mode are labels assigned to speciﬁc
Intel x86 privilege rings built into their microchips. Privilege rings
relate to hardware enforced access control. There are four privilege
rings and they range from ring 0 to ring 3 [5] . Windows only uses
two of these rings, ring 0 and ring 3. Ring 0 has the highest privi-
leges and is referred to as kernel mode (this is the privilege most
drivers run at) by the Windows OS. Ring 3 has the least privileges
and is referred to as user mode (and is the level of privileges that
most applications run at) [6] . We focus on Windows here because
it is still the most targeted OS by malware as reported in [1,7,8] . 
User-mode hooks tend to only record system/API calls made by
a single process since they usually hook one process at a time,
whilst kernel-mode hooks are capable of recording calls made by
all the running processes at a global, system level. This is an im-
portant difference as malware may choose to inject its code into a
legitimate process and carry out its activities from there (where it
is less likely to be blocked by the ﬁrewall). Alternatively, malware
could divide its code into a number of independent processes as
proposed by Ramilli et al. [9] so that no single process in itself is
malicious, but collectively, they succeed in achieving a malicious
outcome. Therefore the choice of hooking methodology could af-
fect the quality of the data gained. Another difference between
kernel and user level hooks is that each one hooks into a differ-
ent API. For example, one type of kernel level hook is to hook
the System Service Descriptor Table (SSDT) whose calls are similar
to those found in the native API, which is mostly undocumented,
whilst user mode hooks typically hook the Win32 API which is
documented [10] . Although methods in the Win32 API essentially
call methods in the native API, there may be some methods in the
native API that are unique to it (since it is only supposed to be
used by Windows developers) [11] . Likewise, there are some user
level methods that do not make calls into the kernel. Therefore,
it is of paramount importance that the difference in utility be-
tween data collected at each level is objectively studied so that
analysts can make an informed choice on which type of data col-
lection method to use. Another factor that could affect the data
collected is that due to the differences between the various types
of hooking methodologies, malware has to use different techniques
to evade each hooking methodology as mentioned by Shaid and
Maarof [12] . Consequently, if a piece of malware is focused on
avoiding a particular type of hooking methodology, it is likely that
any analysts using the same methodology to monitor malware will
see a very different picture to those using another methodology.
Evasive methods are not uncommon; in fact, one study found eva-
sive behaviour in over 40% of samples [13] . It should also be noted
that currently the majority of the existing literature captures user
level calls as shown in Table A1 in the appendix. This suggests that
the literature either believes that user level data has more utility
than kernel level data or does not believe there to be a signiﬁcant
difference between user and kernel level data for the purposes ofetecting malware (although there are kernel level tools available,
hey are not as popular as user level tools). 
Thus, given the aforementioned evasion concerns and funda-
ental differences in each class of hooking methodology, the mo-
ivation of this paper is to study the differences in data collection
t kernel and user level, and consider whether it effects a machine
earning method’s ability to classify the data. In addition, we pro-
ide insights into the utility of the different forms of data collected
rom a machine when observing potentially malicious behaviour.
his is particularly important in the cyber-security domain where
he focus tends to be on the data analysis method over the data
apturing method. We hypothesise that the features of malware
hat are used to differentiate it from benignware differ based on
he data capturing method used. In order to test our hypothesis,
e have created our own Kernel Driver that hooks the entire SSDT
ith the exception of one call. We chose to create our own ker-
el driver as many of the existing tools that hook the SSDT only
onitor calls in a speciﬁc category (such as calls relating to the
le system or registry) and provide no objective justiﬁcation as to
hy they chose the calls they did (if they even make that infor-
ation available). Therefore, we hook all the calls in the SSDT to
nsure we do not miss any subtle details regarding malware be-
aviour and in order to make an objective recommendation on the
ost important calls to hook when detecting malware. Our driver
s also unique in that it collects the SSDT data at a global system-
ide level as opposed to a local process-speciﬁc level. In doing
his, we expect to determine whether collecting data at a global
evel assists in detecting malware or is simply adding noise. In or-
er to gather user level data to compare with our driver, we use
uckoo Sandbox, since it is the most popular malware analysis tool
perating at a user level (as shown in Table A1 in the appendix).
he data gathered from our driver and Cuckoo is then used to ex-
eriment with state of art machine learning techniques to better
nderstand the implications of monitoring machine activity from
ifferent perspectives. Alongside the general insights gained from
lassifying the data, we use feature ranking methods to provide
nsights concerning the behaviour of malware that is utilised by
he classiﬁers in order to distinguish it. In the interests of trans-
arency and reproduce-ability, we have also made the source code
f our kernel driver available at [14] and the data from our exper-
ments available at [15] . The driver can be installed on any system
unning Windows XP 32-bit and easily be extended to run on Win-
ows 7. In summary, the novel contributions of this paper are the
ollowing: 
1. We perform the ﬁrst objective comparison on the effective-
ness of kernel and user level calls for the purposes of de-
tecting malware; 
2. We compare the usefulness of collecting data for malware
detection at a global, system-wide level as opposed to a
local, individual process level, providing novel insights into
data science methods used within malware analysis 
3. We assess the beneﬁts or otherwise of combining kernel and
user level data for the purposes of detecting malware; 
4. We identify the features contributing to the detection of
malware at kernel and user level and the number of features
necessary to get similar classiﬁcation results, providing valu-
able knowledge on the forms of system behaviour that are
indicative of malicious activity; 
5. We conduct an extensive survey of dynamic malware analy-
sis tools used or proposed in the literature; 
6. We create a driver that hooks all but one call in the SSDT
and gathers calls at a global level, which can be used to ex-
tend and enhance our work. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 ’
urther describes the various hooking methodologies and the mo-
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Fig. 1. System call visualisation. 
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o  ivation for this paper. Section 3 ’ describes the various method-
logies already employed in the literature to gather kernel calls.
ection 4 discusses the experiments that were performed and the
nvironment they were performed in. Section 5 presents and in-
erprets the output from these experiments, and in Section 6 , we
ummarise our work and outline the next steps. 
. Problem deﬁnition 
.1. System call structure 
In order to understanding how system calls are hooked, it is im-
ortant to ﬁrst understand how system calls are structured. Fig. 1
rovides an example of the structure of a call tree for a Windows
ystem call. From user mode, a process may call createFileA, cre-
teFileW, NtCreateFile, or ZwCreateFile, however, ultimately, they
ll lead to the NtCreateFile method in the SSDT. In response to
 system call being made, the processor must move from Ring 3
user level) to Ring 0 (kernel level). It does this by issuing the
ysenter instruction. Although createFileA has been shown to call
tCreateFile/ZwCreateFile in Fig. 1 , strictly speaking, it calls cre-
teFileW. However, as they are provided by the same library, they
re shown at the same level. From Fig. 1 it can be seen that to get
he same information within user mode that is available in kernel
ode, more methods need to be hooked. The beneﬁt of hooking
n user-mode, however, is that the analysis tool can observe ﬁner
etails in system calls made. Our aim in this research is to under-
tand if these details are helpful or irrelevant. 
.2. System call hooking 
Fig. 2 shows the hooking methods that can be used to intercept
ystem calls organised according to the privilege they hook at. 
Fig. 2 shows that there are a number of ways to intercept API-
alls using hooks — both at user level and kernel level. Each works
n a slightly different way. An Import Address Table (IAT) hook mod-
ﬁes a particular structure in a Portable Executable (PE) ﬁle. The PE
le format refers to the structure of executables and DLLs in Win-
ows [16] . IAT hooks exploit a feature of the PE ﬁle format, the
mports that are listed in a PE ﬁle after compilation. An IAT hook
odiﬁes the imports so that the import points to an alternative
iece of code as opposed to the legitimate function [11,17] . An in-
ine hook refers to when the prologue of a function is replaced in
emory with a jump to another piece of code [18] . In Windows,
he ﬁrst ﬁve bytes of most functions are the same, therefore, this
an be replaced with a jump to an alternative piece of code where
he system call can be logged, and then control can be returned
ack to the original function (after executing the functionality in
he ﬁrst ﬁve bytes). 
Instrumentation refers to the insertion of additional code into
 binary or system for the purpose of monitoring behaviour. Dy-amic instrumentation implies that this occurs at runtime [19] .
SDT hooks modify a structure in kernel memory known as the
ystem Service Descriptor Table (SSDT). The SSDT is a table of sys-
em call addresses that the OS consults to locate a call when it is
nvoked by a process. An SSDT hook replaces the system call ad-
resses with addresses to alternative code [4,11] . In a Model Spe-
iﬁc Register (MSR) hook, the value of a speciﬁc register is over-
ritten so that it holds the address of the code performing the
ooking. This register is signiﬁcant as after a system call is made,
ts value is loaded into the EIP register (which is the register that
oints to the next instruction to be executed). MSR hooks are fre-
uently employed by Virtual Machine Introspection (VMI) solu-
ions. VMI refers to solutions where the analysis engine resides at
he same privilege level as the hypervisor or Virtual Machine Mon-
tor (VMM) [20] . The last method is IRP hooking (a similar goal can
e achieved with ﬁlter drivers). I/O request packets or IRPs, are
sed to communicate requests to use I/O to drivers. In IRP hook-
ng , a driver intercepts another driver’s IRPs [4,11] . Filter drivers are
rivers that essentially sit on top of a driver for a device meaning
hat they receive all the IRPs intended for that driver [21] . 
There are a number of resources that describe each of the hook-
ng methodologies in much more detail such as [4,11,22] . As can
e seen, the way each mechanism intercepts API-calls differs sig-
iﬁcantly, and each is therefore detected and evaded in a different
anner. Furthermore, each mechanism hooks into different APIs
as mentioned previously), depending on whether it is a user-mode
r kernel-mode hook. Given all these differences, there is a very
eal possibility that a tool hooking in user-mode and monitoring
 speciﬁc process will get different data to a tool monitoring the
ame process in kernel-mode. This therefore raises the question of
hich privilege level gathers more beneﬁcial data for the purposes
f detecting malware? This is the question this paper attempts to
nswer. 
. Literature survey 
In order to gain a better understanding of the tools used in
he literature and the methods that the tools use to gather API-
alls, we conducted an extensive review of the literature and noted
hich tool was used. The results of this are shown in Table A1 in
he appendix. Table A1 contains ﬁve columns; “Name” which is
he name of the tool, “Description” which describes the tool and 
he hooking methodology it uses, “Kernel Hook” which is marked
f the tool employs a hook at kernel level, “User Hook” which is
arked if the tool employs a hook at user level, and “Used By”
hich lists the papers that used that tool. For each tool mentioned
n Table A1 , if the tool was available online, we tested it in order
o understand how it was intercepting API-calls. Where the tool
as not available, we used documentation to determine the type
f hook being used. To limit the length of the table, Table A1 only
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Fig. 2. Hooking methodologies. 
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a  contains tools that had been used at least once in the literature
(i.e., at least one entry in their “Used By” column). 
As can be seen in Table A1 , the majority of tools used to gather
API calls for the purposes of malware analysis use user level hooks
(72%). Currently, the literature suggests that Cuckoo Sandbox is by
far the most used tool. However, that does not mean that all pa-
pers using Cuckoo collected the same data, as it should be noted
that Cuckoo can be enhanced to log additional API calls. Ultimately,
all user level tools suffer from the same problem, in that they run
at the same privilege levels as the ﬁle they are monitoring and are
therefore much easier to evade than kernel level tools. In terms of
kernel data, there are a number of methods used in the literature
to gather data at this level. These can roughly be grouped by the
speciﬁc hooking method they employ to intercept calls. The four
main categories of kernel-mode methods in the literature are: ﬁl-
ter drivers, MSR hooks & Virtual Machine Introspection, Dynamic
Binary Instrumentation (DBI), and System Service Descriptor Table
(SSDT) hooks. 
3.1. Filter drivers 
Filter drivers do not directly communicate with the hardware
but sit on top of lower-level drivers and intercept any data that
comes their way. The most well-known tools using ﬁlter drivers
are Procmon [23] and CaptureBAT [24] . H ˘ajm ˘a ¸s an et al. [25] take
a similar approach to that taken by Procmon and develop a ﬁl-
ter driver that registers with Windows callback functions [26] so
that it is notiﬁed when any changes are made to the registry, ﬁle
system, or processes. Zhang and Ma [27] take a novel approach by
intercepting IRPs in their solution, MBMAS. They then use machine
learning to classify sequences of IRPs as malicious or benign. How-
ever, the limitation with using ﬁlter drivers is that they cannot in-
tercept the same breadth of API-calls that other hooking method-
ologies can. They focus on the major operations in particular cate-
gories (such as ﬁle system and registry). 
3.2. Model speciﬁc register hook 
A Model Speciﬁc Register (MSR) hook essentially hooks the
sysenter instruction. More speciﬁcally, it involves changing the
value of a processor-speciﬁc register referred to as the SYSEN-
TER_EIP_MSR register. This register normally holds the address ofhe next instruction to execute when sysenter is called (which is
alled every time a system call is made). Therefore if this value is
ltered, when the sysenter instruction is called, the processor will
ump to the address pointed to by the new value in the register
which in this case can point to the analysis engine). Since an MSR
ook modiﬁes a processor speciﬁc register, developers need to en-
ure that they modify the registers on each processor (since most
ystems nowadays contain multiple processors) [6] . There are few
xamples of an MSR hook being used as a standalone method in
he literature. Usually, it is employed in the context of VMI solu-
ions. 
VMI refers to tool that operate at the same level as the Hyper-
isor. This provides beneﬁts such as the ability to monitor a VM
ithout having a large presence on the VM (and thereby making it
arder for malware to detect the presence of the analysis engine).
he diﬃculty with monitoring at this level is that a “semantic gap”
ust be bridged in some way. The semantic gap refers to the fact
hat when monitoring at the VMM layer, much of the data avail-
ble is very low level (such as register values). This data is not at a
evel of granularity that is easy to interpret. Therefore, in order to
ridge that, solutions use a number of techniques to convert these
alues to more abstract values. For example, as mentioned previ-
usly, VMI solutions use a variation of the MSR hook whereby in-
tead of placing the address of the analysis solution into the SY-
ENTER_EIP_MSR register, an invalid value is placed into that reg-
ster. As a result, every time a system call is made and sysenter is
alled, a page fault will occur. This will in turn lead to the VMEXIT
nstruction being called which will pass control to the VMI tool
since it operates at the same level as the hypervisor). The VMI
ool must then examine the value of the EAX register in order to
nd out the system call made. Since monitoring system calls in this
anner can have a signiﬁcant impact on performance, VMI tools
sually limit their monitoring to a particular process. To achieve
his, the tool must monitor for any changes in the CR3 register.
he CR3 register contains the base address of the page directory of
he currently running process, therefore, if the page directory ad-
ress of the process of interest is known, then system calls can be
ltered to only those emanating from the process of interest. 
There are a number of VMI solutions in the literature. TTAna-
yze [28] is one of the best known tools employing VMI. TTAna-
yze executes malware in an emulated environment (QEMU [29] )
s opposed to a virtual one. Unlike virtual environments (where
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f  ost instructions are executed on the processor), in emulated en-
ironments all instructions are emulated in software. This, they
xplain, makes it harder for malware to detect that they are not
n a real environment since a real system can be mimicked per-
ectly. However, this comes at the expense of performance, as sam-
les are executed signiﬁcantly slower. Another well known tool in
his domain is Panorama [30] . Panorama is built on top of TEMU
31] (the dynamic analysis component of BitBlaze [31] that can
erform whole-system instruction-level monitoring), and performs
ne-grained taint analysis by monitoring any data touched by the
xecutable being analysed. Its contribution lies in the ﬁne-grained
aint tracking it performs, even recording keystrokes among many
ther things. Ether [32] is a tool in VMI that differs by exploiting
ntel VT [33] which enables hardware virtualisation and provides
 signiﬁcant performance boost when running a VM. Ether is also
articularly focused on not being detectable by malware and, as
uch, has very little presence on the guest machine. Osiris [34] is
imilar to Ether, however, it manages to perform an even more
omplete analysis by also monitoring any processes the original
rocess injects its code into. Lengyel et al. [35] propose DRAKVUF
hich focuses more on reducing the presence of an analysis engine
rom the guest machine as normally there is some code present
n the guest to run the process being monitored or help the VMI
olution with the analysis. However, DRAKVUF employs a novel
ethod to execute malware using process injection and therefore
oesn’t require any additional software to be present on the guest.
n addition, it monitors calls at both user and kernel level. Pék and
uttyán [36] take a different approach by using invalid opcode ex-
eptions instead of breakpoints to intercept system calls. Invalid
pcode exceptions are raised if system calls are disabled when a
ystem call is called. This, they argue, has better performance. In
ddition, their monitoring solution is not paired with a hypervisor
ut exploits a vulnerability [37] to virtualise a live system, forgoing
he need for a reboot to install the monitoring solution. 
While it’s clear that signiﬁcant progress has been made with
MM solutions, there is still a delay overhead incurred from the
echanism (breakpoints/page faults) that is typically used to mon-
tor API-calls. Ether, a well-known tool in this genre, was shown
o have approximately a 30 0 0 times slowdown [38] . This, among
ther things, makes it easier for malware to detect the presence of
 monitoring tool. Furthermore, while some solutions have man-
ged to remove much of the presence of the analysis component
rom the machine being monitored, this has the unfortunate effect
f making it even more challenging to bridge the semantic gap. 
.3. Dynamic binary instrumentation (DBI) 
Dynamic Binary Instrumentation refers to the analysis of an ex-
cutable through the injection of additional code into the source
r compiled code at runtime. This is usually implemented using a
ust-in-Time (JIT) compiler. In DBI, code is executed in basic blocks,
nd the code at the end of each block is modiﬁed so that control
s passed to the analysis engine where it can perform a number
f checks, such as whether a system call is being executed [39,40] .
wo of the most popular frameworks for achieving dynamic instru-
entation in Windows are DynamoRIO [39] and Intel Pin [41] . 
The main limitation in solutions using JIT compilation is Self-
odifying and Self-Checking code (SM-SC) since DBI solutions can
e detected by the modiﬁcations they make to the code. Therefore,
PiKE [42] was proposed as an improvement to such tools since it
niquely did not use a JIT compiler, but breakpoints in memory.
peciﬁcally, it employs “stealth breakpoints” [43] , that retain many
f the properties of hardware breakpoints, but don’t suffer from
he limitation that pure hardware breakpoints do of only allowing
he user to set between two and four. Through using such break-
oints, it is harder to detect the presence of the monitoring toolnd the tool is more immune to SM-SC code. Reportedly, this even
rought a performance gain. Polino et al. [40] built their solution,
rancino, on top of Intel Pin which is focused on countering all
nown anti-instrumentation techniques that are employed by mal-
are to evade detection. They achieve through the use of a number
f heuristics. 
The problems that solutions in this space suffer from is perfor-
ance and remaining undetectable by malware. Though [40] make
 considerable effort towards improving this, they admit their so-
ution is unlikely to be undetectable. 
.4. SSDT Hooks 
This is the method chosen in this paper to monitor API calls at
 kernel level. We chose to use an SSDT hook over a ﬁlter driver,
SR hook, or DBI tool for a number of reasons. A ﬁlter driver
ends to obtain the results from calling a system call as opposed
o the exact system calls called. While a VMM-layer monitor and
BI tool can suffer from a signiﬁcant delay due to the manner
n which it intercepts system calls, allowing malware to detect a
onitor through measuring the delay from performing speciﬁc ac-
ions. In addition, it can be diﬃcult to deal with SM-SC code with
uch tools. Furthermore, bridging the semantic gap whilst keeping
ransparency can be extremely challenging. Ultimately no method
s without its limitations (including the SSDT hook), but we chose
o use an SSDT hook since it has the most similarities in imple-
entation to a user-level hook (except that it hooks into the un-
ocumented kernel) and the data returned from it is analogous to
hat returned from a user level hook. Therefore it seems most suit-
ble for the purposes of a comparison. An SSDT hook also has the
eneﬁt of not modifying anything on disk (since the SSDT is mod-
ﬁed in memory) and therefore leaves a smaller footprint on the
nalysis machine. 
While SSDT hooks have been used previously, they have not
ad as comprehensive a coverage of calls as ours has. Li et al.
44] employed an SSDT hook to automatically build infection
raphs and construct signatures for their system, AGIS (Automatic
eneration of Infection Signatures). AGIS then monitors a program
o see if it contravenes a security policy and matches a signature.
herefore, it only focuses on calls from a speciﬁc process and ig-
ores all other calls. Kirat et al. [45] propose BareBox to counter
he problems associated with malware capable of detecting that
t is being run in a virtual environment. Barebox runs malware
n a real system and is capable of restoring the state of a ma-
hine to a previous snapshot within four seconds. Barebox moni-
ors what the authors perceive to be important system calls using
n SSDT hook. However, as the number of devices attached to the
achine increase, the time it takes Barebox to restore the system
o a clean state increases considerably. Grégio et al. [46] propose
ehEMOT (Behaviour Evaluation from Malware Observation Tool)
hich analyses malware in an emulated environment ﬁrst, then in
 real environment if it does not run within the emulated envi-
onment. They use an SSDT hook to monitor API calls relating to
ertain operations. However, by performing analysis on a real en-
ironment, BehEMOT suffers a similar problem to Barebox in re-
ation to restoration time. Furthermore, the focus with BehEMOT
eems to be producing human-readable and concise reports after
ach analysis and therefore, only small-scale tests were conducted
n a handful of samples. 
As mentioned previously, where our solution differs is that pre-
ious solutions using SSDT hooks only log calls made to certain API
alls by certain processes. Our tool logs all calls (except one) by all
rocesses in order to determine their utility in classiﬁcation. TEMU
s the only tool to offer similar functionality, however, where it dif-
ers is that it runs in an emulated environment (which is easier for
6 M. Nunes, P. Burnap and O. Rana et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 48 (2019) 102365 
Fig. 3. How the AUC responds as sample size is increased . 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1 
Quantity of each category of malware in 
our dataset. 
Category Quantity 
Trojan 1846 
Virus 458 
Worm 86 
Rootkit 34 
Ransomware 23 
Adware 22 
Keylogger 2 
Spyware 2 
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p  malware to detect [47] ) and is focused on providing instruction-
level details as opposed to high-level system calls. 
4. Method & implementation 
In order to conduct the experiments required for our study,
2500 malicious samples were obtained from VirusShare [48] and
2500 clean samples were obtained from SourceForge [49] and File-
Hippo [50] . In order to select an appropriate sample size, we con-
ducted a series of classiﬁcation experiments (described later) on
different sam ple sizes and monitored the trend in the Receiver
Operating Characteristic (ROC) Area Under the Curve (AUC) results
(ROC AUC is described later). In these experiments, we varied the
sample size from 100 samples up to over 20 0 0 (in increments of
100) and for each sample size, we trained the leading classiﬁers
(using 10-fold-cross-validation) and noted the ROC AUC returned
by the classiﬁer. We then plotted the ROC AUC against the sample
size and observed when the curve plateaued for each classiﬁer. The
results are shown in Fig. 3 . 
Fig. 3 shows that after 10 0 0 samples, the AUC values almost
completely plateau. This suggests that after this point, adding more
samples will have an insigniﬁcant effect on the classiﬁcation re-
sults. Therefore, we concluded that 2500 samples would be more
than enough. In addition, this sample size correlated with the data-
set sizes used in the literature [51–54] . The categories of malware
in our dataset are shown in Table 1 . This information was obtained
from VirusTotal [55] . With regards to the clean samples, each was
run through VirusTotal to ensure that it was not malicious. 
To gather calls made to the SSDT, we wrote a Windows Kernel
Driver to hook all but one kernel call in the SSDT since none of
the tools available currently provide this. The only call we did not
hook, NtContinue, was not hooked due to the fact that hooking it
produced critical system errors. Our Kernel driver gathers global
data from a system perspective as opposed to simply monitoring
calls from a single process introduced into the system. Therefore,
the data from the tool can be used to predict whether the ma-hine’s state is malicious or not. To gather user level data we chose
o use a tool readily available since there are already well estab-
ished solutions providing this. Speciﬁcally, we chose to use the
ool most frequently mentioned in the existing literature – Cuckoo
speciﬁcally, Cuckoo 2.0.3). Cuckoo is a sandbox capable of per-
orming automated malware analysis. 
The experiments were carried out on a virtual machine with
indows XP SP3 installed. We chose to use Windows XP as writ-
ng a Kernel driver, particularly one delving in undocumented parts
f Windows, is frustratingly challenging. This, however, is made
lightly easier in Windows XP due to the fact that it has slowly
ecome more documented through reverse engineering. In addi-
ion, all 64 bit systems are backwards compatible with 32 bit bi-
aries [56] and the most commonly prevailing malware samples in
he wild are also 32 bit [57] (with not a single 64-bit sample ap-
earing in the top ten most common samples). As of 2016, AVTEST
ound that 99.69% of malware for Windows was 32 bit [58] . The
eason for the popularity of 32 bit malware samples over 64 bit is
hat its scope is not limited to one architecture. Therefore, given
he current prevalence of 32 bit malware, we did not consider that
sing Windows XP would make our results any less relevant es-
ecially since our method could be repeated on other versions of
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Fig. 4. Workﬂow diagram of our proposed system’s pipeline. 
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c  indows and it would simplify the already challenging engineer-
ng task. The host OS was Ubuntu 16.04 and the Hypervisor used
as VirtualBox [59] . Both the host and guest machine had a con-
ection to the Internet. In order to ensure fairness and to provide
utomation, identical sandbox features to Cuckoo (such as simu-
ated human interaction) were implemented for our kernel driver.
ig. 4 shows our system diagram describing the entire experimen-
al process in order to obtain the results. 
Our kernel driver creates one CSV ﬁle for each system call. A
ew line is written to each ﬁle every time the system call asso-
iated with the ﬁle is called. After the analysis, a shared folder is
sed to transfer over the CSV ﬁles to the analysis machine. Cuckoo
perates in a similar manner however it uses network connections
o transfer over analysis ﬁles from the VM to the host machine,
fter which we transfer the JSON ﬁle to the analysis machine. We
ncode the output produced from each of the monitoring tools us-
ng a frequency histogram of calls within a two minute period. This
eature representation is used to ﬁt a classiﬁcation model for virus
etection. 
.1. Initial experiments’ parameters 
The transformed data from Cuckoo and the Kernel driver was
hen classiﬁed using a selection of machine learning algorithms
rovided by scikit-learn [60] . The machine learning algorithms
hosen were drawn from the existing literature, as the focus of
his research is on the utility of the different views of machine-
evel actions (user vs kernel) rather than new classiﬁcation algo-
ithms. The classiﬁcation algorithms we used were AdaBoost, De-
ision Tree, Linear SVM, Nearest Neighbours, and Random Forest.
he reason we chose these algorithms is that both Decision Trees
nd SVMs are used widely in the literature [61–66] . Random For-
st, while not used as frequently, when used, achieved impressive
esults [61,65,67,68] as has AdaBoost [61] . In addition, though Ad-
Boost is an ensemble method like Random Forest, it comes under
 different class of ensemble algorithms that use boosting as op-
osed to bagging (like Random Forest) and therefore may also be
apable of strong results. Finally, Nearest Neighbours was chosen
ue to its simplicity in order to set a baseline. Each of these meth-
ds are very well documented, however, brieﬂy, AdaBoost [69] is a
ollection of weak classiﬁers (frequently Decision Trees) on which
he data is repeatedly ﬁtted with adjusted weights (usually weight-
ng misclassiﬁed samples more heavily) until, together, the classi-
ers produce a suitable classiﬁcation score or a certain number of
terations are complete. Decision Trees [70] create if-then rules us-
ng the training data which they then use to make decisions on
nseen data. The K-Nearest Neighbor method picks representative
oints in each class and when presented with a new observation
alculates its proximity to the points and assigns it to whichever
s closest. SVMs [71] separate the data by ﬁnding the hyperplanes
hat maximize the distance between the nearest training points in
ach class. Random Forest [72] , like AdaBoost, is a collection of
lassiﬁers, and, like AdaBoost, the classiﬁers are all decision trees.
owever, AdaBoost tends to employ shallow decision trees while
andom Forest tends to use deep decision trees. Random Forestplits the dataset between all the decision trees and then averages
he result. 
For each classiﬁer, the data was split using 10-fold cross-
alidation as it is also the standard in this ﬁeld [54,61,63,73] . It is
ossible to obtain a number of metrics relating to the performance
f the classiﬁers of which we have chosen to use Area Under the
eceiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curve (AUC), Accuracy, Pre-
ision, and F-Measure since these are the metrics commonly re-
orted in the literature [51,63,64,68,74] and they provide a com-
lete view of the performance of the algorithm without missing
ut on subtle details (such as the number of false positives). To un-
erstand these measures in this context, it is important to deﬁne a
ew basic terms. We interpret True Positives (TP) as malicious sam-
les that are correctly labelled by the classiﬁer as malicious. False
ositives (FP) are benign samples that are incorrectly predicted to
e malicious. True Negatives (TN) are benign samples that are cor-
ectly classiﬁed as benign. False Negatives (FN) are malicious sam-
les that are incorrectly classiﬁed as benign. With regards to the
ctual measures used, AUC relates to ROC curves. ROC curves plot
rue Positive Rate (TPR) against False Positive Rate (FPR). FPR is the
raction of benign samples misclassiﬁed as malicious, while TPR
epresents the proportion of malicious samples correctly classiﬁed.
 ROC curve shows how these values vary as the classiﬁer’s thresh-
ld is altered and therefore the AUC is a good measure of a clas-
iﬁer’s performance. Accuracy can be described as all the correct
redictions (malicious and benign) divided by the total number of
redictions. Precision is the number of correctly labelled malware
ivided by the sum of the correctly labelled malicious samples and
he incorrectly labelled clean samples ( TP 
TP + FP 
). This gives us the
roportion of correctly labelled malware in comparison to all sam-
les labelled as malware. Recall is the correctly labelled malicious
amples divided by the correctly labelled malicious samples and
ncorrectly labelled malicious samples ( TP 
TP + FN 
). This tells us the
roportion of malicious samples that are correctly identiﬁed. We
hose to include precision since false positives are a common issue
n malware detection. Recall was not included for brevity and since
t can be quickly calculated from F-Measure (which is included)
hich is the harmonious mean of precision and recall. 
In order to conﬁrm whether the differences in classiﬁcation re-
ults were statistically signiﬁcant or due to randomness, we con-
ucted 10-fold cross-validation 100 times for each classiﬁer. This
ave us 10 0 0 AUC values for each classiﬁer. We then checked to
ee if the 10 0 0 values were normally distributed using Q-Q Plots
f the AUC values against a normal distribution. Provided the data
as normal, we then performed Welch’s t -test [75] in order to de-
ermine whether the differences between the classiﬁcation results
ere statistically signiﬁcant or not (with our signiﬁcance level, α,
et to 5% as is commonly used). We used Welch’s t -test due to
ts robustness and widespread recommendation in the literature
76,77] . 
In addition, in order to gain insight into whether collecting data
t a global level is more beneﬁcial for classifying malware, the API
alls logged by the kernel driver were reduced to just those com-
ng from the process that was being monitored (and any child pro-
esses that it created). Finally, the same data from Cuckoo and our
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Fig. 5. Example graph of feature ranking mechanism. 
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i  Kernel Driver was combined. This was done to see if the combina-
tion of user and kernel level data can improve classiﬁcation results.
4.2. Individual feature ranking 
To further understand the data recorded from the kernel and
user level, and conﬁrm whether the features being used differ de-
pending on the data collection method used, we ranked features by
importance using two metrics for the classiﬁer that had the best
results. For the ﬁrst metric, we put the data from one feature (or
API-call) at a time through each classiﬁer and noted the classiﬁer’s
AUC score in differentiating malicious from clean using only the
data from that feature. We refer to this as the independent fea-
ture ranking method. This method can give an indication on the
strength of individual features. Where it lacks, however, is in its
ability to account for the relationship between features. For exam-
ple, a feature on its own may not be that strong, but when paired
with another, may be very strong. Therefore, to account for that,
we also rank features using each classiﬁer’s in-built feature rank-
ing mechanism (which we refer to as the in-built feature ranking
method). This ranking mechanism works in different ways depend-
ing on the classiﬁer used. For Decision Trees scikit-learn uses the
Gini importance as described here [70] . The same is true for Ran-
dom Forests and AdaBoost since they are composed of a multitude
of Decision Trees. The only difference being that as they are com-
posed of multiple Decision Trees, the importance is averaged over
each one. Finally, with Linear SVMs, the coeﬃcients assigned to
each feature is used to rank them. In the case of K-Nearest Neigh-
bour, there is no in-built feature ranking mechanism, therefore, we
do not include it in this measure. 
In order to verify that both of the feature ranking methods were
selecting features that are optimal, and that the results they pro-
duced could be relied on, we created a plot by calculating the AUC
using only the top ‘x’ features where ‘x’ was gradually increased
from 10 by increments of 10 up to the total number of features. In
addition, this would show the minimum amount of features nec-
essary to obtain similar classiﬁcation results 
4.3. Complete feature ranking 
In order to gain a more consistent but concise view of which
features seemed to be assigned a high importance, we created anggregate measure to rank features across all the classiﬁers. We
pplied it to both the in-built and independent feature ranking
ethods. This will show which features are robust since the previ-
us measure only shows the top ten for the best classiﬁer — which
ould arguably be skewed in its favour. The aggregate measure was
alculated as follows. For each classiﬁer, the features were ranked
ccording to the score they were given by the independent or in-
uilt feature ranking method. Then, the rank was plotted on the
 -axis from 0 (the best rank) to the total number of API-calls (the
orst rank). On the y -axis was a score from 0 to 1 and at each
ank 1 
number of classiﬁers 
was added to the score. Once this was done,
e found the area under the curve and that represented the to-
al strength of the features across all classiﬁers. This global fea-
ure ranking method can be used with any local feature ranking
ethod. Fig. 5 shows an example of this global feature ranking
ethod. In Fig. 5 , the feature in question has got the ranks 0, 20,
0, and 200 in the four classiﬁers it was used with. At each rank,
he value has gone up by 1/4 (since there are four classiﬁers). If a
eature was ranked as the most useful feature across all classiﬁers,
ts ranks would be 0, 0, 0, and 0, and therefore the area under the
urve for it is 1. 
. Results 
In this section, we show the results from classifying data col-
ected at a kernel and user level. In addition, in order to further
nderstand the contributing factor to the results for the kernel
ata, we conduct additional experiments with modiﬁed forms of
he data. Finally, in order to gain a better understanding of the re-
ults, we look at the ten most signiﬁcant features in order to un-
erstand what the machine learning algorithms are using to iden-
ify malware 
.1. Initial experiments 
The results from classifying data collected using the Kernel
river at a global level and data collected from Cuckoo are shown
n Table 2 . 
On the whole, the results show that the data from the kernel
river is marginally better for the purposes of differentiating be-
ween clean and malicious states regardless of the machine learn-
ng algorithm used. The algorithm with the best performance for
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Table 2 
Comparison of classiﬁcation results of data from Cuckoo and Kernel driver. 
Machine learning 
algorithm 
Kernel driver Cuckoo 
AUC Accuracy Precision F -measure AUC Accuracy Precision F -measure 
AdaBoost 0.983 94.1 0.934 0.941 0.973 91.8 0.911 0.920 
Decision Tree 0.944 92.3 0.906 0.925 0.943 87.8 0.918 0.913 
Linear SVM 0.945 90.3 0.873 0.906 0.932 86.9 0.835 0.870 
Nearest Neighbour 0.964 90.3 0.896 0.903 0.942 86.2 0.877 0.863 
Random Forest 0.986 95.2 0.960 0.944 0.984 94.0 0.958 0.942 
Table 3 
p -values returned from Welch’s T -Test using 
AUC values. 
Machine learning algorithm p -value 
AdaBoost 1 . 80 × e −208 
Decision Tree 1 . 41 × e −6 
Linear SVM 8 . 41 × e −78 
Nearest Neighbour 9 . 29 × e −290 
Random Forest 2 . 29 × e −10 
b  
a  
s  
t  
l  
w  
s  
f
 
a  
j  
a  
t  
p
 
h  
t  
b  
t  
t  
G  
w
 
e  
s  
t  
e  
i  
p  
t
 
t  
t  
s  
t  
c
 
d  
s  
w  
a  
w  
u  
i  
Table 4 
Classiﬁcation results of data from the Kernel driver focusing on the process under 
investigation. 
Machine learning 
algorithm 
Localised kernel driver 
AUC Accuracy (%) Precision F -measure 
AdaBoost 0.962 89.6 0.902 0.891 
Decision Tree 0.901 83.8 0.855 0.825 
Linear SVM 0.884 82.0 0.893 0.788 
Nearest Neighbour 0.934 86.6 0.875 0.858 
Random Forest 0.978 92.3 0.944 0.921 
Table 5 
Classiﬁcation results from combining Cuckoo and kernel data. 
Machine learning 
algorithm 
Cuckoo and kernel driver 
AUC Accuracy (%) Precision F -measure 
AdaBoost 0.990 94.9 0.956 0.960 
Decision Tree 0.954 92.4 0.924 0.936 
Linear SVM 0.952 91.5 0.916 0.915 
Nearest Neighbour 0.960 90.3 0.873 0.888 
Random Forest 0.990 96.0 0.962 0.942 
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toth Cuckoo and the Kernel driver was Random Forest, obtaining
n AUC of 0.986 and 0.984, and an accuracy of 95.2 and 94.0 re-
pectively. We also found that, on average (of 10 0 0 runs), 93% of
he samples were given the same label by Random Forest regard-
ess of whether kernel or cuckoo data was used. This shows that
hile there is agreement on a large number of samples, there are
till some samples where data from one was better than the other
or classifying malware. 
In order to verify whether the difference between the Kernel
nd Cuckoo classiﬁcation results are statistically signiﬁcant and not
ust occurring by chance, we used Welch’s t -test on the AUC values
s described earlier. A prerequisite for using Welch’s t -test is that
he data must be normally distributed. We veriﬁed this using Q-Q
lots as shown in Fig. 6 . 
The Q-Q plots show the distribution of the AUC values and
ow closely (or otherwise) they relate to the normal distribu-
ion (shown as a red line). The plots show that the AUC values
arely deviate from the normal distribution. Therefore, Welch’s t -
est would be an appropriate test to observe if the difference be-
ween the Kernel and Cuckoo values are statistically signiﬁcant.
iven that the Q-Q plots for the Cuckoo data were very similar,
e chose not to show them here for brevity. 
In Welch’s t -test, the null hypothesis is that the means are
qual (i.e., H 0 : μ1 = μ2 ), and therefore the alternative hypothe-
is is that the means are not equal (i.e., H a : μ1  = μ2 ). We set the
hreshold α value to be 0.05 as it is an appropriate level for our
xperimentation. Therefore if the p -value returned from perform-
ng Welch’s t -test was less than α, we would reject the null hy-
othesis. Table 3 shows the results of performing Welch’s t -test on
he AUC values from each classiﬁer. 
As Table 3 shows, the p -values returned are considerably lower
han the threshold, 0.05. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis
hat the means of the Kernel and Cuckoo AUC values for each clas-
iﬁer are the same. This shows that, at a signiﬁcance level of 0.05,
he difference between the kernel and Cuckoo results are statisti-
ally signiﬁcant and not just due to chance. 
Therefore, from the results in Table 2 , we can conclude that
ata collected at the kernel level produces better classiﬁcation re-
ults than that collected at a user level, however, it is unclear
hether this is because the data collected at a kernel level was at
 higher privilege and hooking a different API, or because the data
as collected on a global scale of all running processes allowing
s to see everything happening on the machine. In order to clar-
fy whether collecting the data at a global level assisted or harmedhe classiﬁcation process, we limited the kernel data collected to
hat of the data produced by the process being analysed and any
rocesses it created. The results from this are shown in Table 4 . 
From Table 4 , it can be seen that the classiﬁcation results have
ecreased when collecting data from the kernel driver at a local,
rocess-speciﬁc, level. For example, with Random Forest the AUC
as decreased from 0.986 to 0.978 and the accuracy from 95.2%
o 92.3%. In addition, the differences between global and local ker-
el data were also found to be statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore,
t is evident that collecting data at a kernel level is not the only
ontributing factor to the improved classiﬁcation results over user
evel, data must also be collected at a global-level in order to ob-
ain better classiﬁcation results. It is also interesting to note that,
t a signiﬁcance level of 0.05, the classiﬁcation results from lo-
alised Kernel data are statistically signiﬁcantly lower than the
uckoo results as well. This shows that if data is going to be col-
ected at a process-speciﬁc level, user-level hooks provide more
alue since they will also observe many of the process’ interac-
ions that did not reach the kernel. In addition, this shows that
imply collecting at a kernel privilege is not enough. The scope of
he collection (local vs global) is also important. It may be possi-
le to improve the localised Kernel results slightly by attempting
o detect when malware injects its payload into benign software
nd runs it from there. However, that data would be captured by a
lobal Kernel capture and therefore we wouldn’t expect the results
o improve beyond the global kernel results. 
Since limiting the data from the kernel driver did not improve
esults, and given that Cuckoo and the Kernel Driver seemed to
ail on different samples, we combined the data from Cuckoo and
he Kernel driver in order to see whether classiﬁcation results are
mproved by a combination of data from both levels. The results of
his are also shown in Table 5 . 
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Fig. 6. Q-Q Plots of AUC values from Kernel data. 
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Table 6 
Top ten features using independent feature ranking with 
Random Forest. 
Cuckoo Kernel driver 
GetSystemMetrics NtQueryDebugFilterState 
LoadResource NtEnumerateKey 
FindResourceExW NtQueryFullAttributesFile 
NtQueryInformationFile NtReleaseSemaphore 
SetFileTime NtEnumerateValueKey 
NtUnmapViewOfSection NtReadVirtualMemory 
NtOpenSection NtSetInformationProcess 
NtWriteFile NtSetValueKey 
FindResourceA NtOpenEvent 
CreateDirectoryW NtNotifyChangeKey 
Table 7 
Top ten features using in-built feature ranking with Random 
Forest. 
Cuckoo Kernel driver 
GetSystemMetrics NtWriteFile 
FindResourceA NtFlushVirtualMemory 
LdrGetProcedureAddress NtReadFile 
LoadResource NtUnlockFile 
NtReadFile NtOpenMutant 
NtQueryInformationFile NtLockFile 
SetFileTime NtNotifyChangeDirectoryFile 
GetFileAttributesW NtOpenEvent 
NtOpenSection NtDeleteAtom 
NtUnmapViewOfSection NtQueryValueKey 
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Table 8 
Top ten features using in-built feature ranking with Ran- 
dom Forest. 
Cuckoo Kernel driver 
GetSystemMetrics NtReleaseSemaphore 
NtQueryInformationFile NtLockFile 
LoadResource NtUnlockFile 
RegQueryValueExW NtEnumerateKey 
NtUnmapViewOfSection NtWriteFile 
NtDuplicateObject NtOpenMutant 
RegOpenKeyExW NtReadFile 
RegCloseKey NtOpenThreadToken 
NtOpenSection NtReplyWaitReceivePortEx 
NtWriteFile NtQueryVirtualMemory 
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e  Table 5 shows that combining data from both tools produces
lassiﬁcation results that are slightly stronger for the purposes of
alware classiﬁcation with an AUC of 0.990 for both AdaBoost
nd Random Forest. The only classiﬁer with reduced results was
-Nearest-Neighbours suggesting that it struggles to classify data
eyond a certain number of dimensions. Again, as with all the
ata, the differences shown in this table (improvements or oth-
rwise) are statistically signiﬁcant. Therefore, this further validates
he claim that there is a difference in the data from Cuckoo and
he Kernel Driver and that they fail on different samples since the
esults would not have improved had this not been the case. 
.2. Individual feature ranking 
In order to further understand and conﬁrm the differences be-
ween the data gathered by Cuckoo and the Kernel Driver, we
ompare the top ten features using both feature selection meth-
ds (described in Section 4.2 – Individual Feature Ranking)for Ran-
om Forest since it is the best performing algorithm. Table 6 com-
ares the top ten features (in order of score) using the independent
eature ranking method for Cuckoo and the Kernel driver. Table 7
hows the same, but using the in-built feature selection method.
he feature importance is shown only for Random Forest since it
ad the best performance. While it would have been ideal to show
 comparison of all the calls rather than simply the top ten, due to
he limitations of space, we have chosen to restrict it to ten. If the
ata being used by the machine learning algorithms is the same
nd therefore the difference in results is due to some other fac-
or, we would expect the top ten features to be identical or near
dentical. 
From Table 6 , we can see that the data collected from Cuckoo
nd the Kernel do not have any features in common in the top
en for the independent feature ranking method. This suggests that
oth views used very different indicators to distinguish malware.
n terms of the actual methods in the top ten for each tool, the
ernel driver contains relatively generic calls relating to the reg-
stry, threading, memory, events, and processes. Whereas Cuckooontains some highly speciﬁc calls such as SetFileTime (to set MAC
modify, access, and create) times on a ﬁle) and GetSystemMet-
ics (to get information about the system). The presence of Set-
ileTime is not surprising as it is often used by malware to con-
eal conceal its accesses of a ﬁle (and thereby conceal its mali-
ious activity) [78] . GetSystemMetrics is used by malware to eval-
ate whether it is running in a virtual environment or a real one
since virtual machines tend to have low memory and storage).
tUnmapViewOfSection (and NtOpenSection) is also used to evade
etection as malware can use it to replace the code of a legitimate
rocess in memory with its code so that the legitimate process
uns its code. This could be the reason why the kernel driver mon-
toring at a global level performed better than Cuckoo monitoring
t a local level as it was able to capture this behaviour better. The
op ten also includes some methods relating to resources (Load-
esource and FindResourceExW), malware tends to hide its pay-
oad inside the resource section of a PE ﬁle, and therefore these
ethods would be used to extract it into memory. What is also
oticeable in Cuckoo’s top ten is a mix of calls from the native
PI (usually starting with Nt) and the Win32 API. An example of
hat is NtQueryInformationFile, used to obtain information about
 ﬁle. The reason for malware using this method over an equiv-
lent Win32 call is that it provides more information. It’s clear
hat the vast majority of features favoured by classiﬁers to dis-
inguish malware in the Cuckoo data are the evasive features of
alware, whereas the Kernel Driver uses differences in the general
ehaviour of malware to distinguish it from benignware. 
Much of our discussion about the top ten features in Cuckoo for
able 6 also applies to the features of Cuckoo in Table 7 . However,
nlike Table 6 , there is one method in common between the kernel
nd cuckoo features, NtReadFile. This suggests that this feature is
mportant regardless of the perspective from which data is being
athered. Another interesting observation is that there are seven
ethods in common between Cuckoo’s independent ( Table 6 ) and
nbuilt feature ranking ( Table 8 ). This suggests that many of the
ontributing features in Cuckoo’s case can be used alone to detect
alware (which is worth considering when selecting feature rep-
esentation methods). Due to this, many of the observations made
bout Cuckoo’s top ten in Table 6 apply here (such as Cuckoo fo-
using more on malware’s evasive behaviour over its general be-
aviour). Aside from this, Cuckoo’s top ten in Table 7 also con-
ains LdrGetProcedureAddress. This is important as it can be used
y malware to evade static analysis and dynamic heuristic analy-
is by loading all the routines it needs at runtime and therefore
alware can achieve all that it intends to with only that method
inked at compile time. 
On the Kernel side, there is one method in common between
he inbuilt and independent feature ranking method, NtOpenEvent.
his is no surprise as this method can be used to interact with
indows Events which malware could use to ensure it is run ev-
ry day, for example. In general, the top tens for the kernel data
12 M. Nunes, P. Burnap and O. Rana et al. / Journal of Information Security and Applications 48 (2019) 102365 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 9 
Top ten features using in-built feature selection considering all classiﬁers. 
Cuckoo Kernel driver 
NtOpenSection NtFlushVirtualMemory 
InternetCloseHandle NtOpenMutant 
LoadResource NtFilterToken 
SetUnhandledExceptionFilter NtUnlockFile 
SetFileTime NtAccessCheckByTypeAndAuditAlarm 
LdrLoadDll NtQueryVirtualMemory 
CreateActCtxW NtDeleteAtom 
getaddrinfo NtWriteFile 
LdrGetDllHandle NtReadFile 
LdrGetProcedureAddress NtCompleteConnectPort 
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bfor both tables are more focused on the differences in general pro-
cess behaviour between malware and benignware. There are fewer
methods directly related to speciﬁc behaviour exhibited by mal-
ware, however, there are a few exceptions. In the independent fea-
ture ranking for Kernel data shown in Table 6 , there is the method
NtSetInformationProcess, which has been known to be used by
malware to disable Data Execution Prevention (DEP). DEP is a pro-
tection in memory which prevents malware from running code in
non-executable sections of memory [79] . Another method in the
top ten likely to be related to malware is NtNotifyChangeKey. This
is used by a process to ask Windows to notify it whenever any
changes are made to the registry. This could be used by malware
to monitor what is being done on the system or even prevent any
changes to the keys that it created. 
The top ten for the Kernel data using the inbuilt feature ranking
method (shown in Table 7 ) also reﬂects this. As with the previous
table, there are some unusual methods in the top ten features for
the Kernel data; for example, NtNotifyChangeDirectoryFile, a com-
pletely undocumented method. This method is used by a process
to ask Windows to notify it when any changes occur in a directory,
therefore, malware may be using it to simply monitor system ac-
tivity and protect itself or to attach itself to any ﬁle moves. How-
ever, another likely reason is that this method is responsible for
a publicised vulnerability [80] that could be used to expose parts
of kernel memory and defeat Address Space Layout Randomisation
(ASLR). NtNotifyChangeDirectoryFile is not the only undocumented
method in the top ten; NtDeleteAtom and NtOpenMutant are also
completely undocumented by Windows. This could explain why
the Kernel data was able to better distinguish malware from be-
nignware as it is able to capture behaviour that cannot be captured
at user level. Aside from that, the differences in general process
behaviour are being used to detect malware. 
Tables 6 and 7 demonstrate that Random Forest, when trained
on data from Cuckoo and the Kernel Driver, utilises different be-
havioural aspects when identifying if a ﬁle is malicious or not.
While Cuckoo and our kernel driver generally monitor equivalent
calls, the fact that the observed rankings are different suggests that
the scope (local or global) of the calls is an important factor. An-
other contributing factor could be that malware evades or detects
the inline API-hooking technique used by Cuckoo but not the Ker-
nel hooking method employed by our driver (since it requires a
more sophisticated approach to evade). 
To conﬁrm the correctness of both of the feature ranking meth-
ods, we performed some simple feature reduction (described in
“Section 4 - Method & Implementation”) using our feature rank-
ing methods. The results of this are shown in the Figs. 7 and 8 .
We created these graphs for both the data from the kernel driver,
and the data from the Cuckoo driver. However, since the graphs
were a very similar shape, for brevity’s sake, we have only shown
the graphs for the data from the Kernel driver. 
For most of the plots in Figs. 7 and 8 the AUC is at its lowest
with just ten features, however, as the number of features that the
machine learning algorithms use increases, the AUC increases until
it reaches its peak at around 50 features after which the introduc-
tion of new features simply adds noise, thereby reducing or not
contributing to the difference in the AUC. This highlights that the
feature ranking method seems to be able to decipher which fea-
tures are important. In addition, it shows that, in most cases, no
more than 50 API-calls need to be hooked for similar results. 
5.3. Complete feature ranking 
Finally, we applied the global feature ranking metric we cre-
ated (described in “Section 4.3 – Complete Feature Ranking”) to
get a concise yet comprehensive view of the features of malware
that were consistently considered important by all classiﬁers. Theesults from applying the global feature ranking for both the in-
uilt and independent feature selection methods are shown in
ables 8 and 9 . 
From these tables we can ascertain which features perform
est across all the classiﬁers that we used. This gives us a clearer
icture of which features are extremely strong when it comes
o differentiating malware from cleanware. With regards to the
uckoo data, we see in Table 8 some of the features used to
vade detection that we have seen before (GetSystemMetrics,
tUnmapViewOfSection, and NtOpenSection). There are also re-
ource related methods (LoadResource) and the native API method
NtQueryInformationFile) we encountered previously. Of the new
ethods, NtDuplicateObject is interesting because it is used by
alware to evade anti-virus heuristics, as anti-viruses would ex-
ect malware to call the more commonly used DuplicateHandle
o duplicate a process handle to kill or inject into it and would
herefore be less likely to ﬂag a call to NtDuplicateObject as sus-
icious [81] . From this we can conclude that Cuckoo’s top ten in
able 8 contains a mix of evasive, potentially malicious, and gen-
ral methods. 
In contrast, Cuckoo’s top ten in Table 9 has more emphasis on
he evasive behaviour of malware. For example, LdrLoadDll, Ldr-
etDllHandle and LdrGetProcedureAddress are in the top ten and
re known to be used by malware to load DLLs dynamically in
rder to import methods from them. This can be used to avoid
eing detected by IAT hooks. In addition, the method SetUnhan-
ledExceptionFilter in the Cuckoo top ten, is also used as an anti-
ebugging trick by malware as this method is used to specify a
unction to be called in the event of an exception occurring that is
ot handled by any exception handler. However, the function spec-
ﬁed will only be called if the process that raised the exception is
ot being debugged. Therefore, malware can register a function to
eliver its payload and then throw an exception, and if the pro-
ess is being debugged, that function will not be called, and hence
he malware will not display its malicious behaviour. SetFileTime,
hich has been described previously, is also used to curb suspi-
ions. Finally, NtOpenSection, as mentioned previously, can be used
o embed malicious code in a benign process. Therefore, as can be
een, much of the top ten for Cuckoo in Table 9 utilise the evasive
ehaviour of malware to detect it. 
On the Kernel side, each table contains methods from a wide
ange of categories (such as ﬁle-system, threading, networking
tc.), making it more general than the top ten kernel calls in the
uckoo data. While many of the methods in these tables are likely
o be used by malware, they are not used solely by malware (as
ould be expected from a tool monitoring at a global level). On the
hole, it can be seen that with the Cuckoo data, malware is de-
ected through the techniques it uses to detect a monitoring or vir-
ual environment, whereas, with the data from the Kernel Driver,
alware is differentiated from cleanware through how its general
ehaviour differs from the norm. 
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Fig. 7. Feature selection using inbuilt feature selection method. 
Fig. 8. Feature selection using independent feature selection method. 
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a  . Conclusion 
Motivated by a hypothesis that kernel level API calls and user
evel API calls do not produce the same classiﬁcation results, we
onducted experiments to understand the differences by collecting
ata at different privilege levels within the same Operating System.
e collected data at a user level using Cuckoo, and at the kernel
evel using a custom made Kernel driver since there are no exist-
ng tools that hook all the calls in the SSDT on a global scale. The
ata collected was classiﬁed using several state-of-the-art machine
earning algorithms to determine whether collecting data at differ-
nt levels altered classiﬁcation results. The results showed kernel
ata to be statistically signiﬁcantly better for all classiﬁcation al-
orithms despite the fact that user level methods are signiﬁcantly
ore popular in the literature. Random Forest performed the best
ith an accuracy of 94.0% for Cuckoo and 95.2% for the Kernel
river. In addition, by limiting the kernel data to that produced
y the process under observation (and its subprocesses), we found
hat the classiﬁcation results reduced suggesting that the collec-ion of data at a global, system-wide level aided the classiﬁcation
rocess. Our strongest classiﬁcation results were observed by com-
ining the data from Cuckoo (user level) with that from our Kernel
river; achieving an AUC of 0.990 and accuracy of 96.0% for Ran-
om Forest. 
In order to understand why the differences in data collection
ethods had contributed to the different classiﬁcation results, we
erformed feature ranking for Random Forest and collectively for
ll classiﬁers used, and found that the features focused on by clas-
iﬁers differed signiﬁcantly from the data used. The main obser-
ation from this was that monitoring on a process speciﬁc level
s Cuckoo does caused the machine learning algorithm to detect
alware using its evasive properties. Whereas, when trained on
ata obtained from monitoring at a global, kernel level, the ma-
hine learning algorithm used the more general behaviour of the
alware (and processes in general) to distinguish it from clean-
are. The differences resulting from collecting data at different
rivilege levels highlighted the beneﬁt gained from collecting data
t a kernel level (or both levels) in order to detect malware and
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Athe importance of the literature carefully detailing the data collec-
tion method that has been used since the results are affected by
it. To assist with this, we have documented many of the dynamic
malware analysis tools in Table A1 in the appendices of this pa-
per. Table A1 shows that while there exists a plethora of well es-
tablished tools for collecting data at a user level, there are only a
handful of established tools to collect data at a kernel level, and
fewer still that are freely available. While the driver we have writ-
ten is speciﬁc to Windows XP, the main contributions of this pa-
per (a comparison of user and kernel level calls) will apply to fu-
ture releases of Windows. In conclusion, this paper provides the
ﬁrst objective, evidence-based comparison of kernel level and user
level data for the purposes of malware classiﬁcation. In future we
hope to do an in-depth analysis into the implications of the dif-
ferences in the representative features of malware with kernel and
user data. Table A1 
Name Description 
API Monitor [82] Capable of hooking every method 
in the Windows API 
APIMon [86] Uses EasyHook [87] to perform 
inline hooking on all user-level 
APIs 
Buster Sandbox Analyser [89] Not documented how it gathers 
API calls. Monitors speciﬁc 
categories of calls. 
CaptureBAT [24] Uses ﬁlter drivers 
Cuckoo Sandbox [93] Leading open-source dynamic 
malware analysis system [93] . 
Uses inline hook to hook certain 
categories of Windows API calls 
[94] 
CWSandbox [128] Uses in-line code hooks to record 
calls in speciﬁc categories [128] 
Deviare [135] Hooking engine that hooks entire 
Win32 API and is also 
integrate-able with many 
programming languages 
Ether [32] VMI solution focused on being 
undetectable by malware (known 
for achieving good transparency). 
Utilises Xen hypervisor and Intel 
VT [33] to provide hardware 
virtualization 
HookMe Uses Microsoft’s Detours [18] to 
perform in line hooking 
Malpimp [139] Based on pydbg (pure Python 
debugger) 
Micro analysis System (MicS) 
[141] 
Executes in a real (not virtual) 
environment and uses IAT hooking 
NtTrace [143] Tool that uses inline hooking to 
hook ntdll.dll 
Osiris [34] VMI solution using a modiﬁed 
version of QEMU [29] . Also 
provides a simulated network 
environment. Monitors speciﬁc set 
of user and kernel level calls 
StraceNT [145] Inspired by strace on Linux. Uses 
IAT hooking to hook all user-level 
APIs 
Sysinternals Process Monitor [23] Gathers data using a kernel driver 
(ﬁle system ﬁlter driver) [6] 
TEMU [154] Extensible complete-system, 
ﬁne-grained analysis platform 
capable of monitoring any call 
TTAnalyze (used in Anubis 
(Analysis of unknown binaries) 
Sandbox [157] [158] ) 
Uses QEMU [29] to perform 
software emulation. Monitors 
speciﬁc categories of API calls 
through JIT compilation [28] 
WinAPIOverride [164] Free tool to monitor all user-level 
Windows API calls made by 
processes unding 
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ppendix A. Tools used in the literature to gather API-calls Kernel hook User hook Used by 
x [63,83–85] 
x [88] 
x [53,90] 
x [91,92] 
x [51,52,54,67,68,73,95–127] 
x [129–134] 
x [65] 
x [53,64,136,137] 
x [61,138] 
x [140] 
x [142] 
x [144] 
x x [64] 
x [146–148] 
x [51,91,149–153] 
x x [30,155,156] 
x x [62,159–163] 
x [165,166] 
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